POCKET EVIDENCE LAW

Justice Christopher Beale

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Pocket Evidence Law analyses the operation of Uniform Evidence Law in criminal proceedings in Victoria. It seeks to lighten the load on busy practitioners by identifying and concentrating on the “must read” cases on UEL. Most cases cited are decisions of the HCA or the VSCA. Only if a particular point has not been covered by these courts, or there is conflicting authority in other UEL jurisdictions, are decisions of other intermediate appellate courts cited. Full citations are set out in the Table of Authorities at the end of the paper.

The paper adopts the structure of the Evidence Act 2008 (the Act) and the main focus is on Chapter 3 of the Act, which concerns the admissibility of evidence. The relevant sections of the Act are not reproduced, so read this paper with a copy of the Act at hand. References to sections and schedules and the Dictionary are to those in the Act unless otherwise indicated.

Some knowledge of the history of UEL is necessary if one is to appreciate, first, the relevance of various Law Reform Commission reports in interpreting UEL, second, the sources of case law on UEL and, third, the need for caution in using case law from other UEL jurisdictions due to changes made to UEL over time and some differences in UEL from one jurisdiction to another.


UEL in the various jurisdictions contains provisions dealing with jury directions, in both civil and criminal trials. The Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) (the JD Act), which came into operation on 29 June 2015, deletes (ss 20, 116, 116B) or amends (ss 165, 165A) such provisions in the Act, in the main restricting their operation to civil jury trials (cf s 115(7)). Hence, jury directions in criminal trials in Victoria are now mainly regulated by the JD Act.

UEL was intended to make substantial changes to the rules of evidence (Papakosmas at [10]). Reference to the common law in trying to interpret it may be unhelpful (Papakosmos at [8], cf PNJ at [8-9]). The HCA has cautioned trial judges against using their discretionary powers under Part 3.11 of the Act to re-instate the common law rules of evidence (Papakosmos at [97]).
CHAPTER 1 – PRELIMINARY

S 2 - Commencement

The Act applies to “hearings” that commenced on or after 1.1.2010, regardless of when the “proceedings” commenced (Darmody at [14-21]).

S 4 - Courts & proceedings to which Act applies

The Act applies to all proceedings in “Victorian courts”, a term given an expansive definition in the Dictionary. Bail hearings, however, are not constrained by the Act’s rules regarding the admissibility of evidence because of the combined operation of s 8 of the Act and s 8(e) of the Bail Act 1977. The Act only applies to sentencing hearings if the court so directs (s 4(2), (3), (4)).

S 8 – Operation of Acts

By virtue of s 8, it is clear that the Act is not a code in that provisions of other Acts dealing with evidentiary issues continue to operate, eg, s 464H of the Crimes Act 1958 governing tape recordings of confessions. Nor does the Act attempt to deal comprehensively with every matter that might be considered part of evidence law, eg, the rule in Browne v Dunn, which is only partially addressed by s 46.

The old Evidence Act 1958 has been filleted and rebadged as the Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1958 but it remains an important source of evidence law in Victoria.

Some significant evidentiary provisions have been inserted in the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (“CPA”), eg, s 377 which permits evidence of complaint in child sex cases to be used as evidence of the truth of the complaint.

S 9 – Application of Common Law & Equity

There are conflicting views as to whether, having regard to the terms of s 56(1), Chapter 3 of the Act displaces the common law with respect to the admissibility of evidence. These conflicting views are discussed in Haddara in which Redlich and Weinberg JJA (especially at [53] & [65]; cf Priest JA at [162]) concluded, in obiter dicta, that a common law discretion to exclude evidence that would cause an unfair trial subsists and has not been displaced by Chapter 3.

CHAPTER 2 – ADDUCING EVIDENCE

Chapter 2 is chiefly about procedure – how one “adduces” (ie, leads or tenders) evidence, the admissibility of which is determined by the application of the rules in Chapter 3. One should note that parties “adduce” evidence whereas witnesses “give” evidence (ALRC 38 at [59]). The party who is questioning a W (whether in XN or XXN) is adducing the evidence at that point in time (ALRC 26 at [515]). Evidence which is adduced may or may not be admitted.
S 12 - Competence and compellability

The Act operates as a Code in relation to competence and compellability. S 12 is an inclusionary rule – in summary, everyone is presumed competent & therefore, compellable. Sections 13 to 19 create exceptions to this general rule.

S 13 – Competence – lack of capacity

S13(6) creates two presumptions - that a person is competent to: (a) give evidence; (b) which is sworn or affirmed (GW at [14]). Only if the Court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities to the contrary will these presumptions be displaced. Perhaps surprisingly, it is not a precondition for competence to give unsworn evidence that one understands the obligation to tell the truth: it is enough if one can understand the question(s) and give an answer that can be understood (s 13).

S 18 – Compellability of spouses & others in criminal proceedings generally

Under s 18, a witness (“W”) who is the spouse, de-facto partner, parent or child of a defendant/accused (“D”) is compellable by the prosecution (“P”) but such a W can seek exemption from giving evidence in toto or from giving evidence of a communication between W & D.

W must fit one of the relevant categories at the time they are required by P to give evidence (s 18). “Defacto partner” includes a homosexual partner. “Parent” and “child” are defined broadly in the Dictionary, eg, a person “in loco parentis” could be considered a parent.

If W has been excused from giving evidence under s 18, P may still be able to adduce evidence of what W said previously about the incident, pursuant to one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule set out in s 65 (Fletcher at [53], Nicholls at [21-22]).

S 20 – Comment on failure to give evidence

This section has been repealed by the Jury Directions Act 2015, which now regulates jury directions in criminal trials. The relevant provisions in the JD Act concerning directions on the failure to give evidence are ss 41 to 44.

S 32 – Attempts to revive memory in court

A document, from which W wishes to refresh memory, may have been made or adopted when the relevant event was “fresh in the memory” even though the document was made or adopted years after the event in question (Roth at [40]).

S 38 – Unfavourable witnesses

S 38 replaces the common law rule in relation to hostile witnesses. Its operation in conjunction with s 60 (a broad exception to the exclusionary hearsay rule) is arguably the most significant change effected by UEL. S 38 creates an exception to the rule in s 37 that a party may not normally ask leading questions of its own W. The exception has the following elements:
• the evidence of W is “unfavourable” to the party or W is not making a genuine attempt to give evidence or W has made a prior inconsistent statement; &

• the Court gives leave to ask leading questions.

There is conflicting authority as to the meaning of “unfavourable” in this context. The narrow view is that W’s evidence must detract from the case of the party who called W: it cannot be merely neutral (Hadjkiss v CFMEU at [9]). The broad view is that unfavourable simply means “not favourable”, as opposed to “adverse” (McRae at [24]). ALRC 102, which was co-authored by the VLRC, favoured the broad view ([5.46]). In Garrett, the VSCA considered the conflicting authorities in detail and upheld the broad view ([69]), although this was obiter because, in Garrett, W’s evidence was plainly adverse to P’s case ([71]).

The court must have regard to certain criteria in deciding whether to grant leave to the party to cross examine its own W (ss 38(6)(a),(b),192). It must also have regard to the “discretions” (ss 135, 137, common law unfairness discretion) to exclude otherwise admissible evidence.

P may seek an advance ruling as to whether leave will be granted to cross examine its own W should W’s testimony prove unfavourable to P (s 192A; McRae) Indeed, it is no bar to P utilising s 38 that it expects that W’s testimony in response to non-leading questions will be unfavourable (Adam at [18-19], Aslett at [71], McRae at [20]).

As regards the scope of cross examination under s 38, it may include matters tending to show the plausibility of the version of events given by W in prior statements and the implausibility of the version of events given by W at trial (Power at [45]). The party utilizing s 38 may also tender documents containing favourable previous representations (eg police statements), even if W admits having made them (Adam, McRae): s 43 does not prevent this (Aslett at [76]). If W was a co-offender who has pleaded guilty, the s38 cross examination may also extend to that fact and the acceptance by W of a summary of facts on the plea consistent with the version of the events which implicates D (Power at [51-53]).

The scope of cross examination under s 38 may be regulated by s 103 (Anyang (Ruling No 1) at [20]) which only permits cross examination as to credibility if it will “substantially affect” the assessment of W’s credibility.

The greater capacity of P under s 38 to cross examine its own unfavourable W makes it more difficult for P to justifiably decline to call a material W (Kanaan at [84-85]).

S 41 – Improper Questions

Section 41 is not an exhaustive statement of what are improper questions. Other statutory provisions in the Act, other Acts and the common law must be considered. For example, under the common law, it is improper to ask W whether another W is lying (Reeves at [74-78]) but, if that happens, strong directions to the jury may cure the impropriety (Reeves at [35]).

S 42 – Leading Questions

D may be precluded from asking P’s W leading questions in cross examination if the facts would be “better ascertained” by non-leading questions (s 42(3)).
CHAPTER 3 – ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE

The scheme of Chapter 3 involves an inclusionary rule (“Except as otherwise provided by this Act, evidence that is relevant in a proceeding is admissible in the proceeding”: s 56(1)) followed by numerous exclusionary rules (eg, the rule excluding irrelevant evidence (s 56(2), the hearsay rule in s 59 and the opinion rule in s 76 etc) and exceptions to these exclusionary rules. Sometimes the exclusionary rules and the relevant exception appear in discrete sections: other times they are rolled up together in the one section (eg, ss 97 & 98). Relevant evidence may “engage” several exclusionary rules: if it does, exceptions must be found for each exclusionary rule if the evidence is to be admissible (Lithgow City Council v Jackson at [19]). It must also survive the exercise of the discretions in Part 3.11 and, according to Redlich and Weinberg JJA in Haddara, the exercise of the common law unfairness discretion. But what if no objection is taken to the admissibility of otherwise inadmissible evidence? Does that make it admissible? Although obiter, the VSCA in Velkoski at [199] suggest it does not, despite NSW authority for the opposing view.

Chapter 3 is divided into eleven parts, commencing appropriately with relevance.

PART 3.1 - RELEVANCE

S 55 – Relevant Evidence

Relevance is the key to applying the rules of evidence in Chapter 3 of the Act. If one is able to articulate the basis or, better still, bases on which a piece of evidence is relevant, one has done much of the work required for determining whether any exclusionary rules are engaged and, if so, whether any exceptions are available.

S 55 sets out the test for relevance. In short, the test is whether the evidence, if accepted, could logically make a fact in issue more or less likely, however slightly.

In s 55, “a fact in issue” refers to an ultimate fact in issue (Odgers (11th ed) at [1.3.80]) and is not limited to facts in issue that are disputed (ALRC 26 at [641]). One identifies the ultimate facts in issue by reference to the elements of: (a) the offence(s); (b) any mode of complicity relied upon by P; & (c) any defence(s) “open” to D.

In assessing relevance, one assumes the evidence will be accepted by the trier of fact (“if it were accepted”: s 55). There are conflicting views as to what that assumption involves when assessing the relevance of evidence of out of court statements (Odgers (11th ed) at [1.3.120]). The narrow view is that one merely assumes that the statement was made and considers whether the making of the statement, in the circumstances in which it was made, could logically make the existence of an ultimate fact in issue more or less likely (Papakosmos at [31] & [52]). The broad view is that one assumes that the statement was made and that what was asserted in it will be accepted by the trier of fact and then asks whether it logically makes the existence of an ultimate fact in issue more or less likely (Adam at [23]).
PART 3.2 - HEARSAY

Part 3.2 begins with the relevant exclusionary rule and is followed by numerous exceptions to that rule. The broadest exception is found in s 60 but that only comes into play where the relevant previous representation is admissible for a non hearsay purpose. The exceptions set out in ss 65 and 66 are the main gateways now for the admission of complaint evidence but, in that connection, s 108(3), which is concerned with credibility evidence in the form of prior consistent statements, is also an important provision.

S 59 – The hearsay rule – exclusion of hearsay evidence

S 59 is only engaged if evidence of the previous representation is adduced to prove the truth of a fact asserted in the representation.

The statutory hearsay rule is narrower than its common law equivalent because there must be reasonable grounds for supposing that the maker intended to assert the relevant fact.

The word “representation” is used instead of “statement” because a person can assert something by conduct, eg, a gesture. “Representation” & “previous representation” are defined in the Dictionary.

S 60 – Exception – evidence relevant for a non-hearsay purpose

If evidence of a previous representation is admissible for a non hearsay purpose (eg, complaint evidence adduced for a credibility purpose), it is admissible for a hearsay purpose, subject to any “limited use” order under s 136. As mentioned above, s 60 assumes particular importance when it operates in tandem with s 38.

S 62 – Restriction to “first hand” hearsay

There are several exceptions to the hearsay rule (relevantly, the exceptions created by ss 65, 66, 66A) in respect of first hand hearsay.

The test under the Act for first hand hearsay is whether the facts asserted by the maker were facts within the maker’s personal knowledge, ie, facts allegedly seen, heard or otherwise perceived by the maker (s 62(1)).

S 62(1) does not require the W giving hearsay evidence of the maker’s representation to have heard (or otherwise perceived) the representation being made but this requirement, which most people would associate with the concept of first hand hearsay, is picked up by the wording of most of the exceptions (see, eg, the opening words of ss 65(2) & 66(2) but cf s 65(3)).

S 65 – Exception – criminal proceedings if maker not available

There are actually seven different exceptions to the hearsay rule in s 65, each with their own criteria or elements. The exception under s 65(8), which has the least onerous criteria, is only available to D.

Unavailability

For all these exceptions in s 65, the maker must be “unavailable” as defined in the Dictionary. There are several categories of unavailability (Dictionary, Pt 2, cl 4(1) (a) to (g)). If the maker does not fit one of these statutory categories, the maker is deemed to be “available” to give evidence about the “asserted fact(s)” (Dictionary, Pt 2, cl 4(2)).

Darmody indicates the breadth of the term “unavailable”. The alleged victim (“V”) in an assault case was undergoing a jail sentence & refused to testify at D’s trial, though warned by
the trial judge that he could be punished for contempt. V claimed he would be willing to testify when paroled, which he expected to occur in a few weeks. P sought an adjournment until V was paroled but D successfully opposed it. P then argued, successfully, that V was unavailable under cl 4(1)(f) of Part 2 of the Dictionary. P was permitted by the trial judge under s 65(3) to lead evidence of V’s testimony at committal in which he had sworn that his police statement was true and correct. The VSCA upheld the trial judge's rulings.

If W is excused under s 18 from giving evidence against D, W is “unavailable” for the purposes of s 65 (Fletcher at [53], Nicholls).

The test of “unavailability” will not always be easy to satisfy. Both Rossi and ZL indicate that where P claims W is unavailable pursuant to cl 4(1)(e) – namely, P asserts that all reasonable steps have been taken to find W or secure W’s attendance but without success – the courts will demand proof of strenuous attempts to find W, especially where W is important to P’s case (Rossi at [26], ZL at [32]).

The circumstances in which the previous representation was made

In relation to the exceptions in s 65(2)(b), (c) & (d), there are conflicting views as to the circumstances which may be taken into account in determining whether the out of court representation is “unlikely to be a fabrication”, “highly reliable” or “reliable”. The narrow view is that only circumstances or events existing at the time of the representation may be taken into account. The broad view, which has the least support, is that all circumstances & events bearing on the reliability of the representation, whenever occurring, may be considered. The third or middle view, which has the most support, is that some prior or subsequent circumstances or events (such as other representations by the maker) may be considered insofar as they bear on the circumstances that existed at the time the representation was made (Azizi at [46-50]).

Notice requirements

There are written notice requirements if P or D plans to adduce hearsay evidence where the maker is unavailable (s 67) (Azizi at [32]). Notices serve at least two purposes – the other party can investigate whether the maker really is unavailable and, if so, gather evidence to challenge the maker’s credibility and reliability at the hearing. The required contents of notices are set out in the regulations. A court may waive the notice requirements (s 67(4); Darmody).

Unfair Prejudice

If hearsay evidence adduced by P is admissible under s 65, D may nonetheless seek exclusion of the evidence under s137, or under the residual common law unfairness discretion (Bray, Haddara). It may be submitted that because the maker is unavailable to be cross examined, the evidence will not be properly tested and the jury, despite directions by the trial judge, may overvalue the evidence. While each case has to be assessed on its own facts, such submissions have been rejected by the VSCA in Bray, BB & QN and Darmody, all cases where D had an opportunity to cross examine the maker, V, at committal. In BB & QN, Bongiorno JA said at [21] that:

“Whilst the inability to cross-examine a witness at trial is a factor to be taken into account in determining whether the admission of evidence taken in an earlier proceeding will lead to unfair prejudice to an accused, it can never be determinative. Its weight on that issue in any particular case must take into account the legislative intent expressed in s 65(3) that the hearsay rule is not to apply to such evidence and
the fact that the trial judge can always accompany its admission with appropriate directions to the jury.” (footnotes omitted)

S 66 – Exception – criminal proceedings if maker available

Evidence of complaint by V, and not just in sex cases, is often adduced under this exception to the hearsay rule. Previous representations by D consistent with innocence may also be adduced under this exception, provided D testifies (Constantinou at [179-188]).

Available

This exception only applies if the maker is “available” to give evidence about an asserted fact. If the maker does not fit one of the statutory categories of “unavailability” (Dictionary, Pt 2, cl 4(1)(a) to (f)), the maker is deemed to be available to give evidence about the “asserted fact(s)” (Dictionary, Pt 2, cl 4(2)).

In Singh ([15]), V was treated as “available” to give evidence about the fact asserted in her proximate complaint to her son (namely, that she had been raped by a taxi driver), even though she subsequently had no recollection of the alleged rape, having been intoxicated at the time of the taxi ride. Evidence of her complaint to her son was admitted under s 66.

V will be treated as available to give evidence about a fact asserted in an out of court complaint even if s/he makes no mention of the complaint in giving evidence and/or there is a difference between the content of the complaint and V’s testimony. In Miller ([48-51]), where V gave no evidence of having complained to W, her sister, the complaint evidence given by W was held to be admissible under s 66 even though the gist of the complaint evidence was that D had touched her whereas V’s testimony was that D had penetrated her (see also Velkoski at [246-249]).

Maker must give evidence

For the s 66 exception to apply, not only must the maker be available to give evidence, he or she must actually give evidence (s 66(2)). Evidence of the maker’s previous representation may be given by the maker or a person who perceived the representation being made.

Fresh in the memory

This exception to the hearsay rule requires the occurrence of the asserted fact to have been “fresh” in the maker’s memory when the representation was made (s 66(2)). The passage of time is now only one consideration re freshness (s 66(2A), inserted after ALRC 102). In XY [2010], the NSWCCA held at [105] that a complaint of sexual abuse made 4 years after the event in question passed the test of “freshness.” In LMD at [22-25], the VSCA held that two complaints made by V between 7 to 11 years after the alleged molestation by her uncle were fresh complaints, notwithstanding the fact that V was very young (aged 7 or 8) when first molested. In ISJ at [49], the VSCA, discussing XY [2010], flagged their intention, when an appropriate case arises, to consider whether enough emphasis is being given to the temporal aspect in the test of “fresh in the memory.” In Stark at [80], Redlich JA re-iterated this concern. In Clay, Odger’s criticisms of LMD were quoted at length by the VSCA which held at [50] that it was not open to find that certain complaints of childhood sexual abuse made approximately 20 years after the event were made when fresh in the memory. In Pate, a complaint of childhood sexual abuse made some 12 years after the alleged offending was held not to be fresh in the memory but the VSCA acknowledged that there is no rigid time limit (see especially [62-66], [136], [145-146]). In Boyer, a complaint made between 7 and 9 years after the alleged offence was held not to be fresh in the memory and, at [73], the VSCA expressed reservations about LMD and suggested it turned on its “unusual facts.”
S 66(3) limits the operation of s 66(2) by wholly or partially shutting out formal or informal “proofs” of evidence. In Esposito at p34, W’s answers in a record of interview were treated as an informal “proof” of evidence caught by the qualification in s 66(3) because W said repeatedly that what he was telling police was evidence he would be prepared to give against D.

S 66A – Exception – contemporaneous statements about a person’s health etc

This exception (which, prior to the amendments suggested by ALRC 102, was located in s 72) is particularly useful where a party wishes to adduce evidence of a person’s declarations of intention to ground an inference that they acted on that statement of intent. ALRC 102 at [8.158 – 8.174] and Karam at footnote 11 indicate that the courts have to date refrained from a broad construction of this exception because of its potential to undermine the utility of the exclusionary hearsay rule.

S 69 – Exception – business records

S 69 is not limited to first hand hearsay. The term “business records” is broadly defined. For example, records concerning a particular child kept by the Department of Human Services in the course of carrying out their child protection duties can fall within the definition of business records (Lancaster at [14-19]). Remote hearsay contained in such records may be admissible under s 69(2) (Lancaster at [22-27]). In Lancaster, a sex case, the VSCA found that hearsay contained in DHS records concerning two Vs, which formed the basis of a neuro-psychologist’s opinion casting doubt on the reliability of the Vs, was wrongly excluded by the trial judge.

PART 3.3 - OPINION

Part 3.3 contains one exclusionary rule (s 76) and, relevantly, three exceptions to that rule (ss 77,78,79). To paraphrase s 76, an opinion about a fact is not admissible to prove the fact. The three relevant exceptions are for certain lay opinions (s 78), expert opinions (s 79) and opinions (lay or expert) which are admissible for another purpose (s 77: cf s 60). As indicated in the notes to s 76, there are more exceptions to the opinion rule elsewhere in the Act.

Practice Notes, such as VSC Practice Note No 2 of 2014—Expert Evidence in Criminal Trials, which came into force on 1 July 2014, may also regulate the admissibility of expert evidence.

The starting point for determining the admissibility of opinion evidence, like any other evidence, is relevance (Honeysett at [25]). If the observed & assumed facts on which an opinion is based are not proved by admissible evidence, it will fail that test. If the facts proved are dissimilar to the facts assumed, but not too dissimilar, the evidence might be relevant but the weight of the opinion could be significantly reduced.

S 80 expressly abolishes the common law exclusionary rules known as the ultimate issue and common knowledge rules but this does not open the floodgates. The exceptions to the opinion rule control the inflow of opinion evidence, along with the “discretions” in Part 3.11 of the Act.
There is greater scope under the Act for adducing expert evidence on the impact of sexual abuse on child development and behavior (ss 79(2) & 108C, MA [2013]).

There is also scope now for the defence to adduce opinion evidence as to the dangers associated with identification evidence (Dupas, Smith (2000))

S 76 - The opinion rule

The elements of the exclusionary rule created by s 76 are: (i) the evidence is an opinion; & (ii) it is relied upon to prove a fact asserted in the opinion.

“Opinion” is not defined in the Act. An opinion is an inference from observed data (Honeysett at [21], Patrick [2014] at [39], Lithgow City Council v Jackson (2011) at [10]). ALRC 102 at [9.2] also speaks of an opinion as “a conclusion, usually judgmental or debatable, reasoned from facts.”

Statements of fact and opinion form a continuum. It is not always easy to distinguish one from the other (eg, “That’s the man I saw”). If a statement is not an opinion, the opinion rule is not engaged.

S 78 – Exception – lay opinions

The elements of the exception created by s 78 are: (i) W’s opinion is based on what W perceived about a matter or event; & (ii) admission of W’s opinion is necessary to understand his or her perception.

Examples of opinion evidence covered by this exception include opinions as to age, sobriety and speed. A striking example of the breadth of s 78 is Harvey, a sex case: W gave evidence that when she entered D’s office, she saw V standing near D who had what W described as “a look of like sexual gratification – that’s the best way I can express it.” The NSWCCA held this evidence was admissible pursuant to s 78. An example of an opinion not admissible under this exception was V’s interpretation of what D, her father, meant when he said to her that he was sorry for what he had done: she interpreted it as an apology for having sexually abused her as a child (Patrick [2014]).

In Smith (2001), a case in which the HCA decided that evidence of two police officers identifying D from CCTV footage of a bank robbery was irrelevant (because their minimal prior dealings with D made them no better equipped than the jury to say whether it was him in the footage), Kirby J treated the evidence as relevant opinion evidence caught by the exclusionary opinion rule in s 76. He then turned to consider the exception for lay opinion evidence under s 78. He said that ALRC 26 “makes it clear that this provision of the Act was addressed, essentially, to the opinion of eye-witnesses”. In his opinion, the words “matter or event” in s 78(a) referred to the bank robbery (which the police did not witness), not stills from the CCTV footage. ALRC 102 at [9.14] noted that Kirby J’s analysis has attracted criticism but the ALRC did not reject it or recommend any change to s 78. The HCA in Lithgow City Council v Jackson endorsed Kirby J’s analysis at [41], thus significantly limiting the scope of the exception in s 78 (cf Kheir at [65]).
S 79 – Exception – opinions based on specialised knowledge

The elements of the exception created by s 79 are: (i) W has specialised knowledge based on W’s training, study or experience; & (ii) W’s opinion is wholly or substantially based on that knowledge (Honeysett at [23]).

In Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowle, a case in which a woman sued her employer after injuring herself at work on what her expert (a physicist) asserted was an unacceptably slippery stair, Heydon JA, discussing s 79, said at [85]:

“In short, if evidence tendered as expert opinion evidence is to be admissible, it must be agreed or demonstrated that there is a field of “specialised knowledge”; there must be an identified aspect of that field in which the witness demonstrates that by reason of specified training, study or experience, the witness has become an expert; the opinion proffered must be “wholly or substantially based on the witness’s expert knowledge”; so far as the opinion is based on facts “observed” by the expert, they must be identified and admissibly proved by the expert, and so far as the opinion is based on “assumed” or “accepted” facts, they must be identified and proved in some other way; it must be established that the facts on which the opinion is based form a proper foundation for it; and the opinion of an expert requires demonstration or examination of the scientific or other intellectual basis of the conclusions reached: that is, the expert’s evidence must explain how the field of “specialised knowledge” in which the witness is expert by reason of “training, study or experience”, and on which the opinion is “wholly or substantially based”, applies to the facts assumed or observed so as to produce the opinion propounded. If all these matters are not made explicit, it is not possible to be sure whether the opinion is based wholly or substantially on the expert’s specialised knowledge. If the court cannot be sure of that, the evidence is strictly speaking not admissible, and, so far as it is admissible, of diminished weight.”

This analysis was endorsed by the plurality in the HCA case of Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar at [37].

In the recent case of Tuite, the VSCA held that the question of the reliability of an expert’s opinion is to be considered under s137 (or s135), not under s 79. The test of reliability when applying s 137 (or s135) to expert scientific opinion evidence is not general acceptance within the relevant scientific community but proof of validation, thereby facilitating the admissibility of new science but not “junk” science (Tuite at [11], [77], [101 -106]).

Specialised knowledge

The parameters of “specialised knowledge” are unclear. “Knowledge” is more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation (Honeysett at [23]) but the word, at least in this context, does not imply reliability (Tuite at [70]). It includes not only a body of facts but ideas inferred from such facts on good grounds (Tuite at [72]) “Specialised knowledge” is more than ordinary or common knowledge (Honeysett at [23], Velevski at [82] per Gaudron J) but it is not only scientific or technical knowledge (Meade at [147ff], Honeysett at [23]).
The breadth of the concept of “specialised knowledge” is perhaps best indicated by the cases dealing with ad hoc “experts”, eg, voice identification cases where witnesses (eg, police, interpreters) opine as to the identity of speakers heard on telephone intercepts or listening devices, based on repeated listening to the tapes and comparison with undisputed recordings of D’s voice (eg, in a record of interview) (Leung & Wong; Li). The HCA has noted this broad approach to the concept of specialised knowledge (Honeysett at [48]) but has yet to positively endorse it. In Kheir, the VSCA preferred to admit such evidence under s 78 rather than s 79, indicating at [66] that identification evidence which also qualifies as opinion evidence is not normally regarded as expert evidence.

**Wholly or substantially based on specialised knowledge**

“Substantially” is not defined. In the draft Bill included in ALRC 26, the proposed wording in the draft provision (cl 68) was “wholly or partly” which was changed to “wholly or substantially” in the draft Bill (cl 67) included with ALRC 38 but the meaning to be given to “substantially” was not discussed in ALRC 38 (cf [151]) or in ALRC 102. “Substantially” must mean more than “partly” but it is unclear whether it means “mainly” or “predominantly.” OED definitions of “substantially” include “in the main” & “strongly.” It may be that the juxtaposition of “substantially” & “wholly” in s 79 implies that “substantially” in s 79 means “predominantly” or “in the main”: this was the view of the Federal Court in Commissioner for Superannuation v Scott with regard to the phrase “wholly or substantially dependent” in superannuation legislation. The HCA in Honeysett at [24] emphasised that the opinion must be given in form which makes it possible to determine whether the opinion is, at least, substantially based on specialised knowledge.

The HCA decisions of Honeysett and Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar indicate the care which must be taken in determining whether a W, who may be highly qualified, is actually expressing an opinion based on specialised knowledge. In Honeysett, the HCA found that the evidence of a Professor of Anatomy engaged by P, who compared CCTV footage of an offender with images of D in custody, merely “gave the unwarranted appearance of science to the prosecution case that the appellant and [the offender] share a number of physical characteristics”(Honeysett at [45]), a comparison the jurors could make themselves. In Dasreef, an expert who was a chartered chemist, chartered professional engineer, and retired senior lecturer in chemical engineering and industrial chemistry was permitted at trial to give an opinion as to the amount of silica dust that a worker was likely to have inhaled in the course of his work: the HCA held his expertise did not extend to making such calculations.

The HCA in Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar at [41-42] indicated that the requirement that the opinion be wholly or substantially based on specialised knowledge does not import a “basis rule” into Part 3.3 of the Act (ie,, a rule by which opinion evidence is to be excluded unless the factual bases upon which the opinion is proffered are established by other evidence) but, if a proper factual foundation is not laid for the opinion evidence, the opinion will be irrelevant.

**PART 3.4 – ADMISSIONS**

“Admission” is defined in the Dictionary. The weight of authority favours the view that an “admission”, as defined by the Act, includes a statement which, on its face, may appear exculpatory but actually inculpates D (eg, a false alibi) (Esposito). Where a recorded interview with D is adduced solely for voice comparison purposes, the interview is not an
admission and D may not rely on Part 3.4 of the Act to try and exclude the interview (Haddara).

Four major exclusionary rules relevant to admissions are to be found in ss 84, 85, 137 & 138. In summary, these rules exclude any admission which:

- may have been “influenced by” violent, oppressive, inhuman or degrading ("V.O.I.D.") conduct (s 84);
- is possibly unreliable and was made to or in the presence of an investigating official or “caused” by a person capable of influencing D’s prosecution (s 85(a));
- is more prejudicial than probative (s 137);
- was illegally or improperly obtained and public policy considerations favour exclusion (s 138).

S 90 also gives a court a discretionary power to exclude evidence of an admission which it would be unfair to use against D (EM). Whether the admission is unreliable bears upon the issue of unfairness (Weaven (Ruling No 1) at [38]).

**S 84 – Exclusion of admissions influenced by violence and certain other conduct.**

When s 84 is properly raised (s 84(2)), the onus is on P to establish, on the balance of probabilities (s 142), that the making of the admission was not “influenced by” V.O.I.D. conduct (or the threat thereof) towards D or another. The conduct in question need not have been carried out by the police. “Influenced by” connotes a minimal causative link (Odgers (11th ed) pp419-420, [1.3.5020]).

The precise boundaries of “oppressive conduct” are unclear. It is not limited to physical or threatened physical conduct but includes psychological pressure (Higgins (2007)). Unlike the common law notion of “oppression”, it is not necessary for D’s will to be ‘overborne’ in order for the admission to be inadmissible under s 84 (Ul-Haque, [119]).

“Inhuman conduct” is conduct contrary to the human rights recognised in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. “Degrading conduct” is conduct which involves significant humiliation (Odgers (11th ed), p419, [1.3.5020]).

**S 85 – Criminal proceedings - reliability of admissions made by accused**

S 85 deals with possibly unreliable admissions made to investigating officials or persons capable of influencing the prosecution (s 85(1)(a) & (b)).

Despite the absence of a provision equivalent to s 84(2), D must discharge an evidential burden that there is a real issue as to the reliability of the admission before s 85 is engaged (FMJ, [48]). S 85(3) lists some matters that bear on the question of reliability.

In relation to s 85(1)(a), ‘investigating official’ is defined in the Dictionary and specifically excludes a police officer engaged in covert investigations under the orders of a superior.

In relation to s 85(1)(b), the Act does not define who is a person “capable of influencing the decision whether a prosecution should be brought or continued” (herein called “a person of influence”). The concept is obviously broader than investigators as they are covered by s 85(1)(a). Vs will in most cases fit the description (Lieske; TJF) Whether others qualify, such as a parent of a young V (FMJ at [40]), is likely to depend on the degree of influence in each case. D must also show that he or she “knew or reasonably believed” that the individual who
caused the admission to be made was a person of influence: in FMJ, the mother of V held herself out to D as capable of influencing whether the prosecution was instigated.

Under s 85(1)(b), there must also be a causal link between the conduct of the person of influence and the making of the admission by D, a link more substantial than that required under s 85(1)(a).

S 90 - Discretion to Exclude Admissions

Illegalities or improprieties by investigators in obtaining an admission are the grist of s 138 and should not be taken into account in deciding whether or not to exclude an admission under the unfairness discretion in s 90 (Hinton at [5]).

PART 3.6 - TENDENCY AND COINCIDENCE

Tendency evidence and coincidence evidence (T&C evidence) must, by itself or in combination with other evidence, have significant probative value to be admissible (s 97(1)(b) & s 98(1)(b)). If the T&C evidence is adduced by P, its probative value must also substantially outweigh its prejudicial effect (s 101) unless it is led in rebuttal of T&C evidence adduced by D (s 101(3) & (4)).

The T&C rules in Part 3.6 of the Act are purpose based: evidence which discloses other misconduct but is led for a non T&C purpose is not regulated by Part 3.6 (eg, evidence adduced only for context: Hothnyang at [20], WFS at [38]). Evidence that D acquired relevant knowledge from previous misconduct (Ivanoff at [19-20]) or had a continuous state of mind (Higgins [2016] at [20]) may not be regulated by the T&C rules.

Whilst similarities are central to both tendency reasoning and coincidence reasoning, the two forms of reasoning are quite different (Page at [42-66]). Tendency reasoning generally relies on similarities in a person’s conduct and/or the circumstances surrounding their conduct to show that a person had a propensity to think or act in a particular way, and thus support the inference that they thought or acted in that way on the occasion in question. Coincidence reasoning relies on similarities in the relevant events to show that a person had a certain state of mind or engaged in certain conduct on the occasion in question because the degree of similarity makes mere coincidence an improbable explanation. In many cases, both forms of reasoning may be open but not always.

One event is capable of establishing a tendency (Reeves at [56]) but two or more events are required for coincidence evidence (s 98).

Tendency evidence may be constituted by charged (Gentry at [42]) and/or uncharged acts, as can coincidence evidence. T&C evidence often concerns incidents before the charged act but it may concern subsequent incidents (Page at [28], Lancaster at [89]).

It will usually be P that seeks to adduce T&C evidence but D may wish to do so at times, for example, where he or she relies on self defence and wants to adduce evidence that V had a tendency to be aggressive.

Methodology when assessing probative value
According to the Dictionary, the “[p]robative value of evidence means the extent to which the evidence could rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue.” In *Dupas*, a bench of five of the VSCA decided unanimously (see especially [63]) that, when assessing probative value, one generally assumes credibility (ie, that W is honest) but not reliability (ie, that W is accurate). In other words, the risk of mistake is a relevant consideration. Although *Dupas* was concerned with assessing probative value for the purpose of applying s 137 of the Act, the VSCA indicated that this approach to assessing the probative value of evidence applies wherever that term appears in the Act (that is, ss 97, 98, 101, 135, 137, 138) (*Dupas* at [153 - 174]). This broad approach to assessing probative value may be contrasted with the narrow approach followed in NSW (*XY* [2013], DSJ, Shamouil), Tasmania (*KMJ*) and previously followed in Victoria (*KRI* [2011] at [53], *PG* at [62] & [76]) that one generally assumes both the credibility and reliability of the evidence, unless no reasonable jury could accept the evidence. In *Dupas* (see especially [63]), the VSCA considered the narrow approach to be plainly wrong and based on a mistaken view of the common law. In *XY* [2013], the NSWCCA considered *Dupas* but four of the five justices decided to adhere to the narrow approach. In a recent article available online, former HCA justice J.D. Heydon argues that the broad approach endorsed in *Dupas* is wrong ([2014] CICrimJust 22). The HCA will have to settle this controversy.

**Significant probative value**

The principles to be applied in Victoria in determining whether T&C evidence has significant probative value are now summarized in the recent cases of *Velkoski* (especially at [165-179] and *Rapson* [especially at [16-20], although these cases are primarily about tendency evidence. In short, similarities (in the conduct or the circumstances surrounding the conduct or both) are now the touchstone of admissibility for tendency evidence (*Velkoski* at [82]) as well as coincidence evidence (*PNJ* at [8]). Not all similarities, however are considered relevant: circumstances beyond D’s control are not to be counted (*Rapson* at [35] and *Velkoski* at [79-82] endorsing *PNJ* at [19-20]) though it is difficult to follow the reasoning in *PNJ* which introduced this notion of irrelevant similarities.

Striking similarities are not required (*Velkoski* at [169]). If there are no remarkable, unusual or distinctive features, the similarities of conduct or circumstances will need to be close similarities (*Velkoski* at [118-120]). In multiple V cases, similarity of relationship (eg parent/child, teacher/pupil) will not of itself ordinarily suffice (*Rapson* at [16], *Velkoski* at [168]). Dissimilarity between the conduct the subject of the T&C evidence and the conduct constituting the charge in question is not fatal to the admissibility of the T&C evidence provided there is sufficient similarity between the surrounding circumstances, and vice versa (*Page* at [59], *Rapson* at [17-18]).

Similarities are not mentioned in s 97 but they are in s 98. It may be the case that fewer similarities are required for tendency evidence to achieve significant probative value, as was observed in *Middendorp* at [20] but, regrettably, *Middendorp* was not discussed or even mentioned in *Velkoski*. See also *Page* at [54] & [72].
Whilst this author does not agree with the view that Velkoski merely clarified the law rather than raised the bar of admissibility (Rapson at 20), it is certainly the case that Velkoski and Rapson provide greater clarity as to when T&C evidence will pass the test of significant probative value in Victoria. Whether this greater clarity endures remains to be seen. There is a controversy between Victoria (see Velkoski, especially at [142-161]) and NSW (eg, PWD) as to how close the similarities have to be, in the absence of remarkable, unusual or distinctive features, to satisfy the test of significant probative value. Whilst this author is of the view that the controversy was overstated in Velkoski (see also Saoud at [35-48]), it is another controversy that the HCA needs to settle.

When determining whether P’s coincidence evidence has significant probative value, one must have regard to whether any competing hypothesis consistent with innocence is open on P’s evidence (CV at [21-22]). This, however, is not a throwback to the Pfennig test: DSJ makes it clear, especially at [9] & [81], that P does not have to establish that its hypothesis is the only reasonable hypothesis or even that its hypothesis is more probable than the alternative hypothesis suggested by D (DSJ at [10]). Further, CV at [21 -22] indicates that the court does not have regard to evidence that may be adduced by D in support of any hypothesis consistent with innocence.

Risk of Contamination

In multiple V cases, an issue may arise as to whether the similarities in the Vs’accounts are attributable to the fact that they were not given independently of one another. If D can point to evidence which suggests that collusion or innocent infection (“contamination”) is a reasonable possibility, the trial judge must consider the issue (Velkoski at [173c]). In this situation, the trial judge does not assume the credibility or reliability of the evidence. Relationship, opportunity and motive are the main factors for the judge to take into account (BSJ at [21]). If P fails to negate contamination as a reasonable possibility (Velkoski at [173d]), the evidence is regarded as inadmissible (Velkoski at [173c]). But it must be a real, as opposed to a speculative, chance of contamination to justify exclusion on this basis (Velkoski at [173c], BSJ at [27-28], DR at [76 -81], KRI [2011] at [33, 56]).

Prejudice

In applying s 101(2), a judge must weigh the probative value of evidence against the risk of prejudice, that is, the risk that the jury may misuse or overvalue the evidence. In Dupas, the notion of prejudice was considered in the context of s 137. At [175], the VSCA said:

“The Evidence Act does not define the term ‘unfair prejudice’. Consistently with the common law, it has been interpreted to mean that there is a real risk that the evidence will be misused by the jury in some unfair way. It may arise where there is a danger that the jury will adopt ‘an illegitimate form of reasoning’ or ‘misjudge’ the weight to be given to particular evidence. An inability to test the reliability of evidence may carry with it the danger of such misjudgment. Evidence is not unfairly prejudicial because it inculpates the accused.”

In Papakosmos, McHugh J at [92] cited an oft quoted passage from ALRC 26 ([644]) which vividly describes prejudice of the first kind (illegitimate reasoning):
“By risk of unfair prejudice is meant the danger that the fact-finder may use the evidence to make a decision on an improper, perhaps emotional, basis, ie on a basis logically unconnected with the issues in the case. Thus evidence that appeals to the fact-finder's sympathies, arouses a sense of horror, provokes an instinct to punish, or triggers other mainsprings of human action may cause the fact-finder to base his decision on something other than the established propositions in the case. Similarly, on hearing the evidence the fact-finder may be satisfied with a lower degree of probability than would otherwise be required.”

In assessing prejudice, regard must be had to the directions that may be given to the jury to ameliorate the risk. As a general rule, it is to be assumed that juries will follow directions (Dupas at [114] & [177]).

Notice requirements

Finally, reasonable written notice has to be given if a party wishes to rely on T&C evidence. Provision of a proper notice is “no minor matter”: Andelman at [73]. The Evidence Regulations 2009 (reg 7) stipulate the matters that must be addressed in a notice. The Court may waive the notice requirement: s 100.

On Appeal

The principles in House apply to an interlocutory appeal against a ruling made under Part 3.6 (KJM (No2), [9-14]): in other words, the issue is whether the judge’s decision was reasonably open, not whether it was correct. Whether that is also the case on a conviction appeal remains to be determined. In Dibbs at [78-80], the VSCA indicated a strong preference for not applying House principles on a conviction appeal but it did not have to decide the point. In McCartney, a conviction appeal challenging a ruling under s 137, a section which has much in common with s 101, the VSCA at [32], held that, where the facts are not in dispute, House did not apply (see also Tuite at [8]).

PART 3.7 – CREDIBILITY

S 101A – Credibility evidence

Credibility is broadly defined in the Dictionary (Part 2). It is not limited to a person’s veracity: it includes reliability of perception and recollection (Audsley at [30], Dupas at [261-265]). Further, credibility evidence may be evidence that undermines or bolsters a person’s credibility. But the mere fact that the evidence in question impacts upon a person’s credibility does not make it credibility evidence under s 101A. If such evidence is relevant and admissible for a purpose other than the assessment of a person’s credibility, it is not credibility evidence as defined in s 101A and, consequently, Part 3.7 of the Act is not engaged.

Note the reference in s 101A to “other person.” At trial, credibility can be an issue not only in relation to a W but also in relation to a non-W, ie, the maker of a previous representation who is not called but whose previous representation is admitted into evidence (eg, under an exception to the hearsay rule).

“Credibility evidence” as defined by s 101A is regulated by the exclusionary rules and exceptions in Division 2 of Part 3.7 (ss 102 to 108) if it relates to the credibility of W & by
the exclusionary rules & exceptions in Division 3 of Part 3.7 (ss 108A to 108B) if the evidence relates to the credibility of a non-W who made an admissible previous representation. The exclusionary rules and exceptions in Division 3 mirror those in Division 2.

S 102 – The Credibility Rule

S 102 excludes credibility evidence in relation to a W at the trial. Credibility evidence can come in various forms. Some forms, which were permitted by the common law, have been displaced by Part 3.7 of the Act. In BA at [21-25], the VSCA found that Part 3.7, and in particular s 102, overturned the common law rule which permitted a W to give evidence that another W’s reputation for lying was such that he would not believe him on his oath.

S 103 – Cross examination as to credibility

Under the s 103 exception to the credibility rule, the evidence to be adduced in the cross examination of W must be capable of “substantially” affecting the assessment of W’s credibility, which is a change from the common law.

In determining whether a question may be asked pursuant to s 103, the trial judge must assume that W will answer the question in a way most favourable to the questioner (Beattie).

S 104 – Further Protections – Cross examination as to credibility

The exclusionary rule contained in the opening words of s 104 prohibits the adducing of credibility evidence in cross examination of D. There are several exceptions set out in s 104. Pursuant to s 104(3), P may cross examine D about prior inconsistent statements made by him or her; about D’s “bias or motive to be untruthful” (which refers to some interest over and above the particular interest that every D has in the outcome of proceedings); & about D’s inability to have observed or recalled matters about which he or she has given evidence. There is a further “catch all” exception in s 104(2), namely, P may cross examine D about matters bearing on D’s credibility (eg prior convictions) if leave is given.

Pursuant to s 104, the discretion to grant leave is only enlivened if D has adduced (and had admitted) evidence which has certain qualities. The evidence must impugn the veracity of P’s W(s 104(1)(a)) and it must relate solely or mainly to W’s credibility (s 104(1)(b)), for example, evidence that P’s W has a prior conviction for a dishonesty offence. Further, the evidence must not concern W’s conduct regarding the events for which D is on trial (eg, if the W impugned was a co-offender, D will not have thrown away his “shield” by adducing evidence of that W’s dishonest conduct in the course of the alleged joint criminal enterprise.) Nor will D have thrown away his shield if he adduces evidence of W’s conduct in the investigation of the alleged offence (eg, D gives evidence that the Informant “planted” evidence during the investigation)(s 104(5)(b)). If the pre-conditions for a grant of leave exist, the trial judge may (not must) grant leave.

It should be stressed that evidence having these qualities must be admitted as a precondition to a grant of leave: the mere fact that D’s counsel puts questions to P’s W impugning W’s veracity is not enough if W rejects the imputation (Odgers (11th ed), [1.3.7940], fn39), which is a major change from the old law.

S 106 – Exception – Rebutting denials by other evidence
Suppose a party cross-examines W about a matter which is relevant and admissible only on a credibility basis. W denies the assertion(s) put to him. Prima facie, the credibility rule prevents the party from leading evidence from another W to contradict W. If, however, the matter comes under one of the five heads set out in s 106(2), the most important of which are antecedents and prior inconsistent statements, the party may lead “rebuttal” evidence as of right, provided there was adequate “puttage” to W about the matter (s 106(1)(a) & (b)). If none of the five heads in s 106(2) are applicable, the party may seek leave to adduce rebuttal evidence. The fact that leave may be given is a significant departure from the old finality rule.

S 108 – Exception – re-establishing credibility
A party may wish to re-establish or bolster the credibility of W during re-examination of W and/or through the testimony of another W. In the former case, the credibility rule does not apply to evidence adduced in re-examination of W (s 108(1)) though s 39, which regulates the scope of re-examination, must be borne in mind. In the latter case, the party may adduce from the other W evidence of a prior consistent statement of the first W if the preconditions of s 108(3) are satisfied. S 108(3)(b) is an important gateway for the admissibility of complaint evidence. If, as often happens in sex cases, D suggests (or will suggest), expressly or impliedly, that V has fabricated or reconstructed V’s allegations, P can seek leave to adduce evidence of V’s prior complaint: once that evidence is admitted for a credibility purpose under s 108(3), P can then rely on the complaint evidence for a hearsay purpose pursuant to s 60 (Pavitt at [92-110]), unless a limiting order is made under s 136 (ISJ at [57-67]).

S 108C Exception – Evidence of persons with specialised knowledge
Expert evidence may be adduced under s 108C to impeach or bolster the credibility of a W. Leave is required under s 108C(1)(c) but in Audsley, the VSCA said at [45-47] that it will only be in a rare case that a court should refuse leave to adduce evidence which satisfies the other criteria for admissibility under s 108C. In Audsley, D sought to impeach the credibility of P’s chief W, who was a drug addict. The trial judge wrongly refused leave for D to adduce expert evidence from a clinical neuropsychologist as to the effects on memory of drugs, alcohol and sleep deprivation.

In sex cases, attacks on V’s credibility may be based on mistaken assumptions as to how Vs of sexual abuse commonly behave. In MA [2013], P was able to neutralize such an attack using expert evidence admitted under s 108C (see also s 388 of the CPA).

PART 3.8 - CHARACTER

S 110 – Evidence about character of an accused
Good character evidence can be very significant, especially in an oath against oath case (Saw Wah at [41]). A major change under UEL is that a person’s character is not treated as indivisible. Thus, if D leads evidence of his good character in a particular respect (eg, that he has no priors for dishonesty), P is not entitled under UEL to lead evidence that he is of bad character in other respects (eg, that he has priors for violence) (s 110(3), Bishop at [7] – [8]). In other words, Part 3.8 affords D a considerable “shield” against bad character evidence. But in a rape case involving violence, if D leads evidence that he has no priors for sexual offending, P may lead evidence that he has priors for violence (Omot at [20-24]).

P’s interest in ensuring that D receives a fair trial supports the view that P should warn the defence that it may seek leave to adduce evidence of bad character if the defence continues
down a certain path (Hughes at [52 - 53]). Indeed, it will often be prudent for the issue to be
the subject of an advance ruling under s 192A (Hughes at [52]). Whenever the court is invited
to rule on such an issue, it should have regard not only to Part 3.8 of the Act but also the
discretions (Part 3.11) and the considerations set out in s192 (Hughes at [20-21]).

For D to throw away his “shield” against bad character evidence, it must be a conscious
decision to assert good character (Hughes at [23-24]). One should be slow to construe D’s
emphatic denial under cross examination, even one expressed in general terms, as involving
such a decision (Hughes). Where good character has been consciously asserted by D, the
exercise of the discretion by the trial judge as to whether to permit P to adduce bad character
evidence in rebuttal should be guided by, inter alia, considerations of “proportionality”
(Hughes at [33]) and the stage of the proceedings at which the issue arises (Hughes at [46]).

As for bad character evidence which P seeks to adduce in rebuttal, mere rumour will not pass
the test of relevance (Saw Wah at [27, fn 2]) and traffic priors will rarely do so (Saw Wah at
[46, fn 12] & [81]. If bad character evidence is admitted, D may be entitled to a jury
direction that it cannot be used for tendency reasoning but may only be used to rebut the good
caracter evidence (Saw Wah at [84], fn 20)

PART 3.9 - IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE

As explained in greater detail below, ID evidence is defined to include identifications based
on any of the senses but only ID evidence based on sight is subject to the exclusionary rules
in Part 3.9 (ss 114 &115). Under the common law, an ID parade was not a precondition to the
admissibility of ID evidence based on sight whereas it is a precondition under UEL, unless an
exception applies.

Section 116, which dealt with ID directions in criminal trials, has been repealed by the Jury
Directions Act 2015. Save for s 115(7), provisions specifically regulating ID directions in
criminal trials are now found in ss 35 to 37 of the JD Act.

Definitions

Three terms require careful consideration—“ID evidence”, “visual ID evidence” & “picture
ID evidence”. Only if the evidence in question is correctly categorised can one know which
sections of Part 3.9 are engaged, if at all.

The lengthy definition of ID evidence in the Dictionary covers in-court & out-of- court
identifications. Though any summary of the definition has the potential to mislead, the
following might serve as an aide-memoire. ID evidence is:

- an assertion by W (or a report thereof);
- that D (or someone resembling D) was in the “wrong place” (ie, at or near the
  scene of the crime or an act connected with the crime) at the “wrong time” (ie, at
  or about the time of the crime or connected act);
- based on what W perceived at that place and time.

The definition of ID evidence includes evidence of recognition (Trudgett) but ID evidence, as
defined in the Act (cf the broader definition of ID evidence in s 35 of the JD Act), does not
include: evidence of identifications of persons other than D; identifications of objects;
evidence of description (because it is not an assertion that D was or resembles the person); evidence in the form of CCTV footage of a crime or connected act (because such evidence is not an assertion of a person); DNA or fingerprint evidence (ALRC 102 at [13.25ff]); & evidence of an exculpatory identification (because it is not an assertion that D was or resembles the person).

The definition of visual ID evidence (s 114(1)) has three elements:

- the evidence is ID evidence;
- it is based wholly or partly on what a person saw; &
- it is not picture ID evidence.

The definition of picture ID evidence in s 115(1) also has three elements:

- the evidence is ID evidence;
- the identification was made wholly or partly by W examining pictures; &
- the pictures were “kept for the use of police officers.”

“Pictures” are defined to include photographs (s 115(10)). If the photograph from which W identified D was not one kept for the use of police officers (eg, a photo on Facebook), s 114, which regulates visual ID evidence, will be engaged, rather than s 115 (Peterson at [46]).

S 114 – Exclusion of visual identification evidence

In relation to visual ID evidence, the first part of s 114(2) creates the exclusionary rule, namely, such evidence adduced by P is not admissible. The rest of s 114(2) creates three exceptions to the exclusionary rule, all predicated on W not having been intentionally influenced to identify D. Under s 114(2), visual ID evidence is admissible if:

- an ID parade involving D was held before the identification was made; or
- it was not reasonable to hold a parade; or
- D refused to take part in a parade.

The first and third bullet point exceptions above are straightforward. As regards the second exception, s 114(3)-(6) provides inclusive criteria for determining whether it was reasonable to hold an ID parade. If W has identified D from, say, a photograph on Facebook, it may be reasonable for police not to hold a parade because of the “displacement effect” (Peterson at [47-48]).

S 115 - Exclusion of evidence of identification by pictures

As regards picture ID evidence, three exclusionary rules are created by s 115(2),(3) & (5).

The exclusionary rule created by s 115(2) has two elements:

- P is adducing the picture ID evidence;
- the pictures suggest they are pictures of persons in police custody.
There is no exception to this rule. Note that s 115(2) is not just concerned with the propriety of the picture of D which W picks out. In *Pace & Collins*, D unsuccessfully sought exclusion of picture ID evidence under s 115(2) in circumstances where the trial judge noted that some of the photographs in the collection had in the background “portions of a structure that could be consistent with a cell”([17]).

The exclusionary rule created by s 115(3) has four elements:

- P is adducing the picture ID evidence;
- W examined the pictures when D was “in the custody of” a police officer;
- that officer’s police force was investigating the offence with which D has been charged;
- the picture of D examined by W was made before D was taken into that custody.

The courts have given a narrow meaning to the words “in the custody of.” It means “under physical restraint” (*McKellar* at [37]). Hence, if D was not under arrest but just assisting police with their enquiries at the time W examined a photo-board and picked out D, this exclusionary rule is not engaged.

There are two exceptions to the rule created by s 115(3): first, if D’s appearance has changed significantly between the time of the offence and the time he or she was taken into custody; secondly, if it was not reasonably practicable to make a picture of D after he was taken into custody (s 115(4)).

Turning now to the exclusionary rule created by s 115(5), which is the most important of the three exclusionary rules created by s 115. It has three elements:

- P is adducing the PIE;
- W examined the pictures when D was “in the custody of” a police officer;
- that officer’s police force was investigating the offence with which D has been charged.

There are three exceptions to this rule:

- D refused to participate in an ID parade (s 115(5)(a)); or
- D’s appearance had changed significantly from the time of the crime (s115(5)(b)); or
- it was not reasonable to hold an ID parade including D (s 115(5)(c)).

The same inclusive criteria as mentioned in s 114 apply to determining whether it was unreasonable to hold an ID parade involving D (s 115(6)).

S115 (7) concerns jury directions about picture ID evidence (see also the Jury Directions Act 2015, especially ss 35 to 37)

**S 116 – Directions to jury**
S 116 was repealed by the JD Act, effective from 29.6.15. Save for s 115(7), provisions specifically regulating ID directions in criminal trials are now found in ss 35 to 37 of the JD Act.

PART 3.10 – PRIVILEGES

A discussion of “Privileges” could easily run to many pages. In this paper, it is proposed to deal only with the privilege against self-incrimination.

S 128 – Privilege in respect of self-incrimination in other proceedings.

Under the common law, the privilege against self-incrimination, if claimed on reasonable grounds, gives W the right not to answer a question. The privilege against self-incrimination under s 128 gives much less. In most circumstances, it only confers a right to a certificate which protects W against the direct or indirect use of the answer in subsequent criminal proceedings brought against W (s 128(7)). In very limited circumstances, namely, where the answer would expose W to liability for a crime or civil penalty under foreign law (s 128(4)(a)), s 128 gives W the right not to answer. The rationale for this new approach is that it will contribute to improved fact finding.

Application of s 128

First, it only applies to humans - corporations cannot rely on s 128 (s 127; ALRC 102, [15.93]). Second, the wording of s 128 indicates that it only applies in circumstances where W is testifying at a hearing (s 128(1)). In that domain, s 128 displaces the common law privilege against self-incrimination. The common law privilege continues to operate in all other contexts (s 131A; ALRC 102 at [15.109]). Third, if the W seeking to rely on s 128 is D, consideration must be given to the operation of s 128(10), unless D is giving evidence on a voir dire (s 189(6)). With regard to s 128(10), Cornwell ([84]) is HCA authority for the proposition that if the evidence the subject of D’s objection under s 128 directly or indirectly tends to prove D’s guilt of the offence for which he is standing trial (or tends to prove an element of that offence), he cannot rely on s 128, even if his answer might tend to incriminate him of another offence.

There are three elements to the privilege under s 128:

- W objects to answering;
- on the grounds it may incriminate him of an offence or make him liable to a civil penalty under Australian or foreign law; &
- the court determines there are reasonable grounds for the objection.

Pursuant to s 132, the court is obliged to alert W to his rights under s 128. W must object to giving the evidence in question. Then the court must determine whether there are reasonable grounds for the objection.

If reasonable grounds are established, then, pursuant to s 128(4), the court can still require W to answer if two preconditions are satisfied:
• W is not liable to prosecution for a crime or civil penalty under a foreign law;  
• the court is satisfied that it is in the interests of justice for W to answer.

If these preconditions are satisfied, the decision whether to require W to answer is discretionary in nature (Lodhi at [54]). The inclusive criteria referred to in s 192(2) should be considered by the court in exercising that discretion. The case law indicates that an assessment of the reliability of the evidence to be given is also an important consideration (Hore at [175-232], Lodhi).

The certificate confers direct and derivative use immunity (s 128(7)). The protection extends to the use of the evidence as a prior inconsistent statement (ALRC 102, [15.99]) because that is caught by the words “cannot be used against the person.”

S 128(7)(b) expressly provides for derivative use immunity in respect of certified answers. If a W granted a certificate is subsequently prosecuted for an offence, and there appears to be a live issue as to whether the evidence relied on by P was derived from the certified answer(s), ALRC 102 suggests that P has to prove that the evidence was not derivatively obtained (ALRC 102, [15.99] & [15.140]). This view that the legal burden falls on P is supported by the Victorian decision of Warren CJ in DAS (especially at [159]), which concerned interpretation of a provision abrogating the common law privilege against self-incrimination in the Major Crime (Investigative Powers) Act 2004 and rights under the Charter of Human Rights & Responsibilities Act 2006 (“the Charter”), namely, the right to a fair hearing (s 24(1) of the Charter) & the right not to be compelled to testify against oneself (s 25(2)(k) of the Charter). Placing a legal burden of proof on D to prove a derivative link between P’s evidence and D’s certified testimony at an earlier proceeding is likely to be seen as infringing the Charter: placing only an evidential burden on D will not.

PART 3.11 - DISCRETIONARY AND MANDATORY EXCLUSION

The commentary below focuses on the statutory “discretions” in Part 3.11 of the Act. It should, however, be noted that in Haddara, the plurality expressed the view, in obiter dicta, that a broad discretion exists at common law to exclude evidence which would deny D a fair trial and that this discretion is still available in jurisdictions operating under uniform evidence law (see especially Redlich and Weinberg JJA at [53] & [65]; cf Priest JA at [162]). In Bray, the VSCA at [24] assumed the correctness of the view that the common law discretion subsists.

S 136 – General Discretion to limit use of evidence

This discretion may be exercised even though the risk of prejudice does not outweigh the probative value of the evidence (ISJ at [62]). In respect of complaint evidence which is technically admissible under Part 3.2 of the Act, s 136 should not generally be used to limit the use of evidence to buttressing V’s credibility (ISJ at [57-61], Papakosmos).

S 137 – Exclusion of prejudicial evidence in criminal proceedings

S 137 replaces the common law Christie discretion but is expressed as a rule (“…must refuse to admit”). The onus is on D to show that the danger of unfair prejudice outweighs the probative value of the evidence: if so, the court must exclude the evidence.
To date, the VSCA has considered the application of s 137 to the following types of evidence: hearsay (Bray, ISJ, Singh, BB & QN, Darmody); opinion evidence (Meade, Tuite, MA, DG); admissions (WK); identification evidence (Dickman, Peterson, Dupas, McCartney, DJC, THD); credibility evidence (MA); character evidence (Huges).

The first step in applying s 137 is to assess the “probative value” of the evidence. As discussed above in relation to s 101 (T&C evidence), the VSCA in Dupas (especially [63]) rejected the narrow approach adopted in NSW and Tasmania and endorsed a broad approach to assessing the probative value of evidence: whilst one assumes credibility (ie, honesty), one does not assume reliability (ie, accuracy). In other words, the risk of mistake is a relevant consideration.

The concept of unfair prejudice was discussed above in relation to s 101 (T&C evidence). In addition to evidence which may be misused or overvalued by a jury, unfair prejudice could arise from the evidence which D may need to adduce in rebuttal. In Cook, for example, P relied on evidence of D hiding from police as indicating consciousness of guilt of the alleged offence but D claimed he hid because of other wrongdoing on his part: the NSWCCA held at [48] that s 137 applied and the evidence of D hiding should have been excluded.

On an interlocutory appeal in relation to a ruling under s 137, it appears that the principles in House apply (Tuite at [8], McCartney at [47- 51], Singh at [26])

On a conviction appeal, where the facts are not in dispute, the appeal court can and should decide for itself whether the decision under s 137 was correct (Dickman at [100], Dupas at [241], McCartney at [32]).

S 138 – Exclusion of improperly or illegally obtained evidence

S 138 replaces the common law Bunning v Cross discretion but is expressed as a rule (“ …is not to be admitted”).

The major change from the old law is that once D discharges the burden of proving that there was illegality or impropriety, the burden of proof then shifts to P to justify admissibility. There are also provisions which deem certain conduct to be improper (ss 138(2), 139), including false statements during questioning (s 138(2)(b)). In Weaven (Ruling No 1), a police “scenario case” where D was tricked into confessing to murder, Weinberg J ruled that if the police false statements were deemed to be improper (which he doubted), he would nevertheless exercise his discretion to admit the evidence of the confession (see especially [64-70].

The VSCA has assumed to date that, on appeal, the principles in House apply (MD at [27-30], Marijancevic at [13]). That is still likely to be the situation regarding interlocutory appeals but not conviction appeals if the facts are not in dispute. This follows from the approach taken by the VSCA in McCartney, which was a conviction appeal challenging a ruling under s 137.

Where a trial judge’s ruling under s 138 turns on a finding of fact based on an assessment of the honesty of W, the VSCA will be reluctant to interfere, even if the VSCA considers the fact “improbable.” In Marijancevic, a drug case in which illegally obtained evidence was excluded by the trial judge, the VSCA at [80-83] thought it improbable that a police officer
knowingly contravened the requirement that affidavits in support of applications for search warrants be sworn but the trial judge’s decision to exclude the evidence under s 138 was not overturned.

The failure of police to properly swear affidavits used to obtain search warrants caused much consternation in Victoria until the introduction of retrospective legislation. In Marijancevic, the VSCA indicated at [92] that where the failure to swear an oath was found to be inadvertent, a trial judge might quite properly admit evidence. The issue was also the subject of a ruling by Lasry J in Borg, a murder case. Lasry J ([98]) rejected P’s submission that the relevant police had properly sworn the affidavits, but even though Lasry J went on to find that the failure by the police to properly swear the affidavits was deliberate, he admitted the illegally obtained evidence under s 138.

CHAPTER 4 – PROOF

S 165 – Unreliable Evidence

As from 29.6.15, s 165 was amended by the JD Act, restricting its operation to civil trials. Sections 31 to 34 of the JD Act now regulate directions in criminal trials about unreliable evidence.

S 165B – Delay in prosecution

As from 29.6.15, s 165B was deleted by the JD Act. Directions concerning delay and forensic disadvantage are now dealt with by ss 38 to 40 of the JD Act and directions concerning delay and credibility are now dealt with by ss 48 to 54 of that Act
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