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4.18 - Tendency Evidence

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Overview

  1. Part 4, Division 2, of the Jury Directions Act 2015 regulates jury directions on ‘other misconduct evidence’. This is defined as:
    1. Coincidence evidence, as defined in the Evidence Act 2008;
    2. Tendency evidence, as defined in the Evidence Act 2008;
    3. Evidence of other discreditable acts and omissions of an accused that are not directly relevant to a fact in issue;
    4. Evidence that is adduced to assist the jury to understand the context in which the offence charged or any alternative offence is alleged to have been committed (Jury Directions Act 2015 s26).
  2. This topic examines tendency evidence as a form of ‘other misconduct evidence’.

    What is "Tendency Evidence"?

  3. "Tendency evidence" is evidence that is used to prove that a person has or had a tendency to:
  4. The following types of evidence may, in certain circumstances,[1] be used to prove that a person had such a tendency:

    How do "tendency evidence" and "coincidence evidence" differ?

  5. Care must be taken to distinguish "tendency evidence" from "coincidence evidence" (R v Nassif [2004] NSWCCA 433; Gardiner v R [2006] NSWCCA 190; KJR v R [2007] NSWCCA 165).
  6. “Tendency evidence” is evidence that allows the jury to reason that:

    he did it before; he has a propensity to do this sort of thing; the likelihood is that he did it again on the occasion in issue (Hughes v The Queen (2017) 344 ALR 187 at [70] per Gageler J).

  7. "Coincidence evidence" is evidence which uses the improbability of two or more events occurring coincidentally to prove that a person performed a particular act or had a particular state of mind (Evidence Act 2008 s98).
  8. While the evidence that constitutes "tendency evidence" and "coincidence evidence" may seem similar, the type of inferential reasoning used by the jury differs for each type of evidence:
  9. Judges must therefore separately determine whether to admit evidence as tendency evidence and whether to admit evidence as coincidence evidence. In doing so, they must consider how the parties seek to use the evidence, as that will determine which admissibility test applies and what directions the jury must be given (R v Nassif [2004] NSWCCA 433; Gardiner v R [2006] NSWCCA 190; KJR v R [2007] NSWCCA 165).
  10. See Coincidence Evidence for further information concerning coincidence evidence.

    How do "tendency", "relationship" and "context" evidence differ?

  11. "Tendency evidence" must also be distinguished from:

    Determining whether evidence is "tendency evidence"

  12. It is important for judges to determine whether evidence is sought to be admitted and used as tendency evidence, coincidence evidence, relationship evidence and/or context evidence. That determination will affect the admissibility test to apply and the directions to be given.
  13. As this can be a difficult task, at the start of the trial the judge should ask the prosecution to characterise the evidence in question and explain how it is alleged the evidence is relevant (see HML & Ors v R (2008) 235 CLR 334 per Hayne J).
  14. The prosecution should clearly articulate how it says the jury should use the relevant evidence. If that use would involve tendency reasoning (see above), then the evidence must be treated as tendency evidence (Qualtieri v R [2006] NSWCCA 95; R v Li [2003] NSWCCA 407; R v AH (1997) 42 NSWLR 702; R v Ngatikaura [2006] NSWCCA 161; R v Cakovski (2004) 149 A Crim R 21).

    Admissibility of Evidence Capable of Proving a Tendency

  15. Evidence which may show that a person has a particular tendency may be admitted:

    Admitting evidence in order to prove a tendency

  16. The "tendency rule" states that evidence is generally[3] not admissible as tendency evidence (i.e., for the purposes of proving a tendency) unless:
  17. In determining the probative value of tendency evidence, the court must examine whether the evidence is capable of rationally affecting the probability of the existence of a fact in issue to a significant extent. The facts in issue are the facts which establish the elements of the offence (Hughes v The Queen (2017) 344 ALR 187 at [16]).
  18. The probative value of tendency evidence depends on the issues the evidence is used to prove. Where the evidence is used to prove the identity of the offender for a known offence, close similarity between the prior conduct and the offending is necessary. However, different considerations arise where the fact in issue is whether the alleged offending occurred. Where the defence suggests that prosecution witnesses have fabricated their allegations, proof that the accused has a tendency to engage in the conduct alleged is likely to be influential in determining whether the prosecution has excluded the possibility that the witnesses have fabricated their accounts or been mistaken (Hughes v The Queen (2017) 344 ALR 187 at [39]-[40]. See also Thrussell v R [2017] VSCA 386 at [53]).
  19. In assessing whether evidence has significant probative value, the court must consider:
  20. While conduct which has been repeated on multiple occasions will often have greater probative value, evidence of a single occasion is capable, in appropriate cases, of meeting the tests for admission as tendency evidence. Any delay between instances of the alleged conduct will also be relevant when assessing the probative value of the evidence (Reeves v R (2013) 41 VR 275; GBF v R [2010] VSCA 135).
  21. Where it is the prosecution who seeks to lead tendency evidence about the accused, the evidence will only be admissible if its probative value substantially outweighs any prejudicial effect that it may have on the accused (Evidence Act 2008 s101).
  22. The provisions concerning the admissibility of tendency evidence are a code which replaced the common law rules regarding propensity and similar fact evidence (Hughes v The Queen (2017) 344 ALR 187 at [31]; Velkoski v R (2014) 45 VR 680; R v Ellis (2003) 58 NSWLR 700; Murdoch v R (2013) 40 VR 451).
  23. In determining whether tendency evidence has significant probative value, the possibility of collusion, collaboration or innocent infection is not relevant, unless those possibilities rise to a level where it would not be open to the jury rationally to accept the evidence (R v Bauer [2018] HCA 40 at [69]). Previous decisions holding that the possibility of collusion destroys the probative value of tendency evidence have been overruled (compare Velkoski v R (2014) 45 VR 680; Murdoch v R (2013) 40 VR 451; PNJ v R (2010) 27 VR 146; BSJ v R (2012) 35 VR 475).
  24. If judges decide to admit tendency evidence in circumstances where there is a risk of collusion, collaboration or innocent infection, the judge must warn that jury that it must find that the evidence from each witness was not affected by other witnesses before acting on the tendency evidence (Velkoski v R (2014) 45 VR 680; Murdoch v R (2013) 40 VR 451 at [134]; PNJ v R (2010) 27 VR 146; BSJ v R (2012) 35 VR 475).

    Admitting evidence for another purpose

  25. The "tendency rule" only governs the admission of evidence that is sought to be adduced as tendency evidence. It does not prevent the admission of evidence that may show that a person has a tendency (e.g., evidence of prior violent acts) for another purpose (e.g., to provide context for the offence) (see, e.g., R v Quach [2002] NSWCCA 519; Conway v R (2000) 98 FCR 204; FDP v R (2008) 74 NSWLR 645; R v Cornwell (2003) 57 NSWLR 82; R v Lock (1997) 91 A Crim R 356).
  26. Such evidence does not need to comply with the tendency rule in order to be admitted. Instead, its admissibility is governed by the general test of relevance in Part 3.1 of the Evidence Act 2008, and the discretions contained in Part 3.11 of that Act (R v Quach [2002] NSWCCA 519; Conway v R (2000) 98 FCR 204; FDP v R (2008) 74 NSWLR 645; R v Cornwell (2003) 57 NSWLR 82; R v Lock (1997) 91 A Crim R 356).
  27. While such evidence may be admitted for a non-tendency purpose, if it is not admissible under the tendency rule, it cannot be used to prove that a person has or had a relevant tendency (Evidence Act 2008 s95).
  28. This means that where evidence is admitted for another purpose, the jury may only use it as tendency evidence if it also satisfies the requirements of s97 and s101 (Evidence Act 2008 s95; R v OGD (No 2) (2000) 50 NSWLR 433; KJR v R [2007] NSWCCA 165).
  29. This issue can be important in trials involving multiple charges. In such trials, questions may arise as to whether evidence admitted to prove one charge can be used as tendency evidence to prove a matter relevant to one of the other charges. In answering this question, the court must determine whether that evidence would be admissible under the tendency rule if the charges were heard separately (R v Nassif [2004] NSWCCA 433; R v Ellis [2004] HCA Trans 488).

    Uses of Tendency Evidence

  30. Where evidence of a person’s past behaviour is admissible under the tendency rule,[4] the jury may use that evidence to:
  31. For example, if tendency evidence is led that proves that a person behaves in a violent manner when in a particular state of mind, the jury may use that evidence to find that that person acted in the same manner at the time of the alleged offence (R v Andrews [2003] NSWCCA 7; R v Li [2003] NSWCCA 407; c.f. R v Cakovski (2004) 149 A Crim R 21).

    Demonstrating an improper sexual interest

  32. One common type of tendency evidence is "guilty passion" evidence. This consists of evidence that the accused has acted in a sexual way towards the complainant on one or more other occasions (Velkoski v R (2014) 45 VR 680; HML & Ors v R (2008) 235 CLR 334; R v Mckenzie-McHarg [2008] VSCA 206; R v AH (1997) 42 NSWLR 702; Rolfe v R [2007] NSWCCA 155; R v ELD [2004] NSWCCA 219; R v Greenham [1999] NSWCCA 8).[5]
  33. "Guilty passion" evidence may be admitted as tendency evidence, to prove that the accused had an improper sexual interest in the complainant and a willingness to express that interest (HML & Ors v R (2008) 235 CLR 334; R v Mckenzie-McHarg [2008] VSCA 206; JLS v The Queen (2010) 28 VR 328; Rolfe v R [2007] NSWCCA 155).
  34. The probative value of “guilty passion” stems from the:

    ordinary human experience that, where a person is sexually attracted to another and has acted on that sexual attraction and the opportunity presents itself to do so again, he or she will seek to gratify his or her sexual attraction to that other person by engaging in sexual acts of various kinds with that person (R v Bauer [2018] HCA 40 at [51]).

  35. Evidence can only be used to show a sexual interest in the complainant if it is admitted as tendency evidence. Where evidence is relevant and admissible for another purpose, it cannot be used to show a sexual interest unless the conditions for admission as tendency evidence are met (Evidence Act 2008 s95; Ritchie v R [2018] VSCA 31 at [36]-[45]).
  36. The tendency evidence that demonstrates the accused’s sexual interest with the complainant does not need to constitute criminal acts (R v EF [2008] VSCA 213; R v McKenzie-McHarg [2008] VSCA 206).
  37. Where the prosecution alleges a series of sexual acts over a period of time against a single complainant, both charged and uncharged acts may be admissible as tendency evidence to show the accused had a sexual interest in the complainant and was willing to act on that interest. Provided the conduct relied on as tendency evidence is not far removed in time, and is of similar gravity to the charged acts, it is not necessary for there to be special features or independent support for the tendency evidence (R v Bauer [2018] HCA 40 at [48]).
  38. However, in the unusual case where there is only one uncharged act which is remote in time and of different gravity to the charged acts, then some special feature will be necessary to give that uncharged act significant probative value (IMM v The Queen (2016) 257 CLR 300 at [61]-[64]).
  39. Although evidence of a single prior opportunistic incident will usually not be capable of supporting an inference that the accused had an improper sexual interest in the complainant (R v Young [1998] 1 VR 402), such evidence must be considered alongside the other evidence given in the case. The tendency evidence does not, by itself, need to prove the existence of a sexual interest (R v DD (2007) 19 VR 143).

    Tendency Evidence and Multiple Sexual Complainants

  40. Prior to Hughes v The Queen (2017) 344 ALR 187, Victorian jurisprudence had held that it was not permissible to speak in general terms about a sexual interest in multiple complainants. Instead, the focus was on the nature of the accused’s conduct, rather than the accused’s state of mind (Velkoski v R (2014) 45 VR 680, [173(f)], [234]).
  41. In Hughes v The Queen (2017) 344 ALR 187, the majority rejected this limitation, noting that s97(1) explicitly provides for tendency evidence to prove a state of mind; a sexual interest in young children is a particular state of mind; and, in cases involving charges of sexual offending against young children, proof of that state of mind may have significant probative value (at [32]).
  42. Where there are multiple complainants, some feature of the alleged acts will be necessary to link the allegations together before the evidence can have significant probative value. This may stem from a special, particular or unusual feature, such as a brazen disregard of the risk of discovery (Hughes v The Queen (2017) 344 ALR 187; R v Bauer [2018] HCA 40 at [58]-[59]; Bauer v The Queen [2017] VSCA 176 at [62]; McPhillamy v The Queen [2018] HCA 52).

    Directions About Tendency Evidence and Reasoning

  43. The need for directions about tendency evidence and reasoning depends on whether a direction is sought and whether, despite the absence of any request, there are substantial and compelling reasons for giving the direction (Jury Directions Act 2015 ss14 - 16). See Directions Under Jury Directions Act 2015 for information on when directions are required.
  44. Tendency evidence is a form of ‘other misconduct evidence’. The content of the direction is specified in Jury Directions Act 2015 Part 4, Division 2.

    Directions where tendency evidence adduced by prosecution

  45. Where tendency evidence is adduced by the prosecution and a direction is necessary, the trial judge must:
    1. Identify how the evidence is relevant to the existence of a fact in issue; and
    2. Direct the jury not to use the evidence for any other purpose; and
    3. Direct the jury that it must not decide the case based on prejudice arising from what it has heard about the accused; and
    4. If the evidence only forms part of the case against the accused, inform the jury of this fact (Jury Directions Act 2015 s27(2)).
  46. In giving the direction, the judge does not need to:
    1. Explain what the jury should consider in deciding whether to use the evidence as tendency evidence;
    2. Identify impermissible uses of the evidence;
    3. Refer to any other matter (Jury Directions Act 2015 s27(3)).
  47. The Jury Directions Act 2015 abolishes the common law obligations in relation to directions on tendency evidence. This includes the obligation to warn the jury against substitution reasoning (compare R v Grech [1997] 2 VR 609).
  48. Judges should avoid using the term "uncharged acts" when describing tendency evidence, as it may invite speculation about why no charges were laid (HML & Ors v The Queen (2008) 235 CLR 334; R v McKenzie-McHarg [2008] VSCA 206).
  49. The judge must explain to the jury how the tendency evidence is relevant in the case. This requires the judge to link the use of the evidence to the issues in the case. It is not sufficient for him or her merely to describe the evidence as giving rise to a tendency to act in a certain way (R v Li [2003] NSWCCA 407; R v Martin [2000] NSWCCA 332).
  50. To assist with this task, it will usually be helpful to have the prosecutor describe each step along the path (or paths) of reasoning which the jury may follow to infer the accused’s guilt from the evidence (HML & Ors v The Queen (2008) 235 CLR 334 per Hayne J).
  51. If the tendency evidence may demonstrate the accused’s sexual interest in the complainant, it is proper for the trial judge to tell the jury that they might use the evidence:
  52. The language of "guilty passion" is inappropriate and should not be used with the jury. The focus of the jury must be on whether the evidence proves that the accused had a sexual interest in the complainant and a willingness to act on that interest. Such evidence should be described as demonstrating a "sexual interest" (HML & Ors v The Queen (2008) 235 CLR 334; R v Ball [1911] AC 47; R v BJC (2005) 13 VR 407; R v Sadler (2008) 20 VR 69; Rofle v R [2007] NSWCCA 155; Velkoski v R (2014) 45 VR 680).
  53. Judges should also avoid use of the term "relationship evidence" to describe the respective positions of the parties and the unilateral actions of the accused (HML & Ors v The Queen (2008) 235 CLR 334 per Kiefel J; Frawley v R (1993) 69 A Crim R 208; R v Nieterink (1999) 76 SASR 56).

    Standard of proof

  54. At common law, it was once thought that tendency evidence adduced to show that the accused had a sexual interest in the complainant could not be used unless the jury was satisfied that the evidence proved that interest beyond reasonable doubt (R v Sadler (2008) 20 VR 69; DJV v R [2008] NSWCCA 272; DTS v R [2008] NSWCCA 329; JDK v R [2009] NSWCCA 76; R v MM (2000) 112 A Crim R 519). This common law rule was abolished by R v Bauer [2018] HCA 40 at [80].
  55. The requirement for proof of tendency evidence beyond reasonable doubt is also prohibited by the Jury Directions Act 2015. Under the Act, the only matters which must be proved beyond reasonable doubt are the elements of the offence and the absence of any defences. The judge generally may not direct the jury that any other matters need to be proved beyond reasonable doubt (Jury Directions Act 2015 ss61, 62). See Circumstantial Evidence and Inferences for further information.
  56. An exception to this rule may exist where the evidence involves sequential reasoning from other charged offences. In Dempsey v The Queen, the prosecution involved two alleged instances of armed robbery. The jury was invited to use the similar method in which the offender lured the victims to the relevant location as tendency evidence to prove the identity of the offender. The Court held that the jury could not use the method of committing the first offence as tendency evidence showing that the accused committed the second offence unless the jury was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed the first offence. The court noted any direction which allowed the jury to use the commission of the first offence as tendency evidence without proof to the criminal standard would undermine the standard of proof required to convict in relation to the first offence (Dempsey v The Queen [2019] VSCA 224, [76]).

    Directions where tendency evidence adduced by the accused about a co-accused

  57. Where tendency evidence is adduced by an accused about a co-accused, the prosecution or the co-accused may request a direction about that evidence.
  58. In giving a direction about that evidence, the trial judge must
    1. Identify how the evidence is relevant to the existence of a fact in issue; and
    2. Direct the jury not to use the evidence for any other purpose; and
    3. Direct the jury that it must not decide the case based on prejudice arising from what it has heard about the co-accused (Jury Directions Act 2015 s28(2)).
  59. In giving the direction, the judge does not need to:
    1. Explain what the jury should consider in deciding whether to use the evidence as tendency evidence
    2. Identify impermissible uses of the evidence
    3. Refer to any other matter (Jury Directions Act 2015 s28(3)).

    Directions where evidence is not admissible as tendency evidence

  60. Under the Jury Directions Act 2015 ‘other misconduct evidence’ is defined as:
    1. Coincidence evidence;
    2. Tendency evidence;
    3. Evidence of other discreditable acts and omissions of an accused that are not directly relevant to a fact in issue;
    4. Evidence that is adduced to assist the jury to understand the context in which the offence charged or any alternative offence is alleged to have been committed (Jury Directions Act 2015 s26).
  61. The defence may ask the judge to warn the jury not to use other misconduct evidence which is not tendency evidence as tendency evidence (Jury Directions Act 2015 s29).
  62. The judge may also warn the jury against the risk of misusing evidence as tendency evidence where the evidence does not fall within the definition of ‘other misconduct evidence’.
  63. A warning against using evidence as tendency evidence warns the jury not to infer from the evidence that the accused is the kind of person who is likely to have committed the offence charged, and to use that conclusion as evidence of guilt (R v ODG (No 2) (2000) 50 NSWLR 433; Martin v State of Tasmania [2008] TASSC 66; Qualtieri v R [2006] NSWCCA 95; R v Chan [2002] NSWCCA 217; R v Conway (2000) 98 FCR 204; Gipp v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 106; R v ATM [2000] NSWCCA 475; FMT v R [2011] VSCA 165; R v M, BJ (2011) 110 SASR 1).
  64. If uncharged acts are led as part of a multiple charge indictment, the judge should make it clear that the warning against tendency reasoning applies to both the charged and uncharged acts (see R v CF [2004] VSCA 212; R v DD (2007) 19 VR 143).
  65. When giving a warning against tendency reasoning, the judge should not refer to the accused having a "propensity" or a "criminal propensity" or a "tendency". Instead, judges should describe the evidence as demonstrating a "pattern of behaviour" or, in sexual offence cases, a "sexual interest".
  66. When evidence is admitted which discloses paedophilia, but which is not admitted as tendency evidence (because the requirements of ss97 and 101 have not been met), directions against tendency reasoning are especially important. This is because such evidence is highly prejudicial (see R v J (No 2) [1998] 3 VR 602; R v DCC (2004) 11 VR 129; R v T (1996) 86 A Crim R 293; R v DD (2007) 19 VR 143).
  67. It may not be necessary to warn the jury against tendency reasoning when the accused is charged with a "course of conduct" offence (such as persistent sexual abuse), and the component acts are separately charged (KRM v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 221). See also Persistent Sexual Abuse of Child (From 1/7/17).
  68. There also may not be any need to warn the jury against tendency reasoning when there is little or no risk that the jury will use the evidence to engage in such reasoning (Jury Directions Act 2015 s29(2)). In some cases, a warning against tendency reasoning can increase the risk of the jury engaging in impermissible tendency reasoning and defence counsel may ask the judge not to give the direction (FDP v R (2008) 74 NSWLR 645; R v DH [2000] NSWCCA 360; R v Bastan [2009] VSCA 157.

    Timing of the Charge

  69. Short directions on the use of tendency evidence which are consistent with Jury Directions Act 2015 Part 4, Division 2, should be given at the time the evidence is led. Detailed directions may also be given in the final charge (see Jury Directions Act 2015 s10; R v Grech [1997] 2 VR 609; R v Beserick (1993) 30 NSWLR 510; Qualtieri v R [2006] NSWCCA 95).

     

    Notes

[1] See "Admissibility of Tendency Evidence" below.

[2] Thus, while tendency evidence and coincidence evidence are often referred to together (as though tendency evidence is invariably also coincidence evidence and vice versa), this is not correct. Sections 97 and 98 describe two different paths of reasoning (R v Nassif [2004] NSWCCA 433; Gardiner v R [2006] NSWCCA 190; KJR v R [2007] NSWCCA 165).

[3] The tendency rule is subject to a number of exceptions and exclusions. See, e.g., Evidence Act 2008 ss94, 97(2), 110, 111.

[4] This includes evidence that is actually admitted under the tendency rule, as well as evidence that is admitted for another purpose but which is admissible under that rule (see above).

[5] In some cases this is described as an improper sexual "relationship" with the complainant. However, it is not the relationship between the parties that is of relevance here. It is the accused’s (often unilateral) attraction to, or interest in, the complainant that is of importance. The term "sexual relationship" is therefore avoided wherever possible.

Last updated: 23 October 2019

In This Section

4.18.1 - Charge: Tendency Evidence (General Charge)

4.18.2 - Charge: Tendency Evidence (Sexual Interest Evidence)

4.18.3 - Charge: Tendency Evidence (General Defence Evidence)

See Also

Victorian Criminal Charge Book

Part 1: Preliminary Direction

1.1 – Introductory Remarks

1.2 – Jury Empanelment

1.3 – Selecting a Foreperson

1.4 – The Role of Judge and Jury

1.5 – Decide Solely on the Evidence

1.6 – Assessing Witnesses

1.7 – Onus and Standard of Proof

1.8 - Separate Consideration

1.9 - Alternative verdicts

1.10 – Trial Procedure

1.11 - Consolidated preliminary directions

Part 2: Directions in Running

2.1 - Views

2.2 - Providing Documents to the Jury

2.3 – Other Procedures for Taking Evidence

2.4 – Unavailable witnesses

2.5 – Witness invoking Evidence Act 2008 s128

Part 3: Final Directions

3.1 - Directions Under Jury Directions Act 2015

3.2 - Overview of Final Directions

3.3 - Review of the Role of the Judge and Jury

3.4 - Review of the Requirement to Decide Solely on the Evidence

3.5 - Review of the Assessment of Witnesses

3.6 - Circumstantial Evidence and Inferences

3.7 - Review of the Onus and Standard of Proof

3.8 - Review of Separate Consideration

3.9 - Judge’s Summing Up on Issues and Evidence

3.10 - Alternative Verdicts

3.11 - Unanimous Verdicts and Extended Jury Unanimity

3.12 - Taking Verdicts

3.13 - Perseverance and Majority Verdict Directions

3.14 - Intermediaries and ground rules explained

3.15 - Concluding Remarks

3.16 - Consolidated final directions

Part 4: Evidentiary Directions

4.1 - The Accused as a Witness

4.2 - Child Witnesses

4.3 - Character Evidence

4.4 - Prosecution Witness's Motive to Lie

4.5 - Confessions and Admissions

4.6 - Incriminating Conduct (Post Offence Lies and Conduct)

4.7 - Corroboration (General Principles)

4.8 - Delayed Complaint

4.9 - Distress

4.10 - Prosecution Failure to Call or Question Witnesses

4.11 - Defence Failure to Call Witnesses

4.12 - Failure to Challenge Evidence (Browne v Dunn)

4.13 - Identification Evidence

4.14 - Opinion Evidence

4.15 - Previous Representations (Hearsay, Recent Complaint and Prior Statements)

4.16 - Silence in Response to People in Authority

4.17 - Silence in Response to Equal Parties

4.19 - Coincidence Evidence

4.20 - Other forms of other misconduct evidence

4.21 - Unfavourable Witnesses

4.22 - Unreliable Evidence Warning

4.23 - Criminally Concerned Witness Warnings

4.24 - Prison Informer Warnings

4.25 - Word Against Word Cases

4.26 - Differences in a Complainant’s Account

4.27 - Alibi

Part 5: Complicity

5.1 - Overview

5.2 - Statutory Complicity (From 1/11/14)

5.3 - Joint Criminal Enterprise (Pre-1/11/14)

5.4 - Extended Common Purpose (Pre-1/11/14)

5.5 - Aiding, Abetting, Counselling or Procuring (Pre-1/11/14)

5.6 - Assist Offender

5.7 – Commonwealth Complicity (s 11.2)

5.8 – Commonwealth Joint Commission (s 11.2A)

5.9 - Innocent Agent (Victorian Offences)

5.10 - Commission by Proxy (Commonwealth offences)

Part 6: Conspiracy, Incitement and Attempts

6.1 - Conspiracy to Commit an Offence (Victoria)

6.2 - Conspiracy (Commonwealth)

6.3 - Incitement (Victoria)

6.4 - Attempt (Victoria)

Part 7: Victorian Offences

7.1 - General Directions

7.2 - Homicide

7.3 - Sexual Offences

7.4 - Other Offences Against the Person

7.5 - Dishonesty and Property Offences

7.6 - Drug Offences

7.7 – Occupational Health and Safety

7.8 - Offences against justice

Part 8: Victorian Defences

8.1 - Statutory Self-Defence (From 1/11/14)

8.2 - Statutory Self-Defence (Pre - 1/11/14) and Defensive Homicide

8.3 - Common Law Self-Defence

8.4 - Mental Impairment

8.5 - Statutory Intoxication (From 1/11/14)

8.6 - Statutory Intoxication (23/11/05 - 31/10/14)

8.7 - Common Law Intoxication

8.8 - Automatism

8.9 - Statutory Duress (From 1/11/14)

8.10 - Statutory Duress (23/11/05 - 31/10/14)

8.11 - Common Law Duress

8.12 - Provocation

8.13 - Suicide Pact

8.14 - Powers of arrest

8.15 - Police search and seizure powers without a warrant

Part 9: Commonwealth Offences

9.1 - Commonwealth Drug Offences

9.2 - People Smuggling (Basic Offence)

9.3 - People Smuggling (5 or More People)

9.4 - Use of carriage service for child pornography material

Part 10: Unfitness to Stand Trial

10.1 – Investigations into Unfitness to Stand Trial

10.2 – Special Hearings